Its not really news when I say that we’re in a bear market (the widely accepted definition for western equity markets is a sustained 20% drop is much smaller than the 50% drop of the Nifty from our January high of 6357). But the question on everybody’s mind is - where are we in this bear market? The beginning, the middle, or at the end (the bottom)? Let’s have a look at the past three Indian bear markets and see if we can get some clues (data below sourced from Morgan Stanley Report, “India Strategy: How to Cope with a Bear Market”, published on 13 March 2008):
First: 2 April 1992 (top) - 26 April 1993 (bottom)
12 months trailing PE at the Bull market peak: 33.9
At the Bear market bottom: 13.6
Decline of 60%
Time taken in days to cross the previous high: 1425 (4 years)
6 months return from the bottom: 34%
From the above data we can see that:
A bear market leads to an average decline of 51% of the index, and upto 60% decline in PE ratios
If you managed to invest at the bottom, 6 months down the line you’d have made an average of 35% return (although spotting the bottom is near impossible - so this is rather misleading)
It lasts anywhere between 1-2 years
It takes anywhere between 2.5 to 5 years for the market to ‘recover fully’ to its previous peak - therefore the bear market is accompanied by a considerable ‘horizontal’ market
The bull market peak is over 32x earnings (PE ratio), and tends to more than halve at the bottom.
Now lets compare the above learnings from above to the ‘Bear Market’ of 2008:
Tipping point: Subprime leading to FII exit
If October 27 low, was the bottom then it has only lasted about 9 months
Sensex peak at 21,207
Sensex October 27 low at 7697
Decline of 64%
Nifty peak at 6357
Nifty October 27 low at 2253
Decline of 65%
12 months trailing Nifty PE at the Bull market peak: 28.3
At October 27 low: 10.7
Decline of 62%
Clearly we have overshot the average index decline of 51% that we have seen in previous bear markets, by a significant 13 percentage points. We have also seen large declines in index PE ratios - 4 percentage points more than the last bear market. Moreover, the PE on October 27 was an astoundingly low 10.7 - the lowest ever for the data since January 99, as I talk about in my post here.
This begs the questions - how much longer do we have to suffer such a market?
History tells us that there seems to be 3 ‘phases’ of a bear market:
First phase: A sharp initial fall - ‘capitulation’
Middle phase: A bear market rally on low volumes, where some investors a lulled into the false sense that the bear market is over
Final phase: Long slow downward grind in price where market valuations hit rock bottom
Clues that the bear market is coming to an end:
Indiscriminate selling leading to sharp falls
A major potential corporate or political crisis
Highly negative but irrational rumours about financially sound companies
Very low PE ratios for blue chip companies - often in single digits.
Based on history and what we’ve seen above, I’d wager that we’re at the beginning of the final phases of the bear market. We have seen a lot of volatility, and quite a significant rally over the last week, from 7967 to over 10,000 - a rally which seems to be coming to an end as I write this.
Globally, we have already seen unprecendented collapses in the banking and insurance sector - AIG, Lehman, Bear Stearns, HBOS etc. just to name a few. We haven’t seen an bankruptcies / defaults in India at such a significant scale, although rumours of ICICI bank collapsing, and then Unitech defaulting were rife. As far as PE ratios are concerned the Nifty’s trailing PE was at its lowest in a decade last week. All these point to us having crossed the bottom.
Do note however, that the 7697 low was not lower than the previous bull market’s peak, something that seems to be a pattern. Moroever, as I reported here, FIIs have only pulled out 20% of their investment in India, and I expect that this is not the end. Whether they like it or not, they may be forced to pull more out of our market even at these attractive valuations, in order to meet liabilities or liquidity pressures due to redemptions.
Well, the interest rate cycle has already turned, indeed quite aggressively with the Congress government trying do do everything it can before the elections in March next year, including leaning on banks to cut rates (which has worked). Inflation is on its way down, so that’s also pretty good news. Corporate earnings results have been really bad this quarter and we might see another couple of quarters of bad results before they start to improve. Therefore I think there is a lower bottom down the line. When will we see it? After another round of FII money getting pulled out, optimistically, I think we’ll probably see it over the next 6 months, pessimistically - given the grave global scenario - 12 months. That would make the bear market period 15-21 months.
As far as recovery is concerned, ’strong economic fundamentals’ can be cited in favour of the arguement for a shorter horizontal period. Fundamentals, however, doesn’t really seem to help when the global economy is in the toilet, and there’s no foreign money to push the market back up to the levels that it saw in this bull run.
There’s been so much change in the global banking landscape, with banks going bankrupt, being nationalised, and being bought over by others that its become quite difficult to keep track.
Check out this excellent interactive by FT that takes you though a 10,000 feet chronological walk though a Global ‘Bank Street’, telling you which banks have been nationalized, bought over, expanding, or have a new business model. Sigh I still cannot get over the fact that we’ll soon be able to get a Goldman Sachs Debit Card.
First of all let me clarify that in my opinion, there is *absolutely no chance* that ICICI Bank can collapse. Its too well capitalized, its too big and its too important to the Indian financial system for that to happen.
I posted a small article this morning, which has been getting a lot of pageviews. I never expected, however that I’d get a response from ICICI themselves. This is what they left in the comments section of my post:
September 30, 2008
Dear Sir/ Madam,
We greatly value your relationship with us. In the context of the developments in the international financial markets, we thought it pertinent to bring to you our perspective of the prevailing situation.
We would like to bring to your attention that the Indian banking system is well regulated and significantly insulated from global developments. This is because it is mandatory for all Indian Scheduled Commercial Banks to retain 34% of the deposit base in the form of Government Securities (SLR) and cash with RBI (CRR). Besides, sound policies of RBI have ensured prudent credit practices in the Indian Banking system.
ICICI Bank is already compliant with the BASLE II requirement in respect of risk management practices and capital adequacy. At 13.4%, ICICI Bank has one of the highest capital adequacy ratios in the Indian banking industry. Last year, ICICI Bank raised Rs. 20,000 crores (US $ 5 billion) of equity capital, which almost doubled our equity capital base. We have a net worth of over Rs. 47,000 crores (US$ 10 billion), again one of the highest in the banking industry in India We have consolidated total assets of over Rs. 4,84,000 crores (over US $ 105 billion), which is diversified across a wide range of asset classes across retail, wholesale and rural banking.
ICICI Bank is amongst the most profitable banks in India. In FY 08, ICICI Bank made a profit of Rs. 4,158 crores (US$ 900 million).
ICICI Bank has the highest credit ratings in the Indian financial sector. We have AAA ratings for our instruments, such as senior bonds, subordinated bonds, and deposits. We have the highest foreign currency bond ratings assigned to any Indian bank from Moodys and S&P.
We continue to invest in growth, indicating our confidence in the opportunities in the Indian market. In 07-08, ICICI Bank added 650 new branches, taking the total strength to over 1400 branches.
We thank you for reposing trust in us over the years. We look forward to setting new benchmarks in service levels in India and to create a bank that you will continue to be proud of.
As a testimony to the above, please find below the clarification given by Reserve Bank of India.
Date : 30 Sep 2008
RBI Statement on ICICI Bank’s Financial Position
There are reports in some sections of the media that based on rumours regarding the financial strength of ICICI Bank, depositors are withdrawing cash at its ATMs and branches in some locations.
It is clarified that the ICICI Bank has sufficient liquidity, including in its current account with the Reserve Bank of India, to meet the requirements of its depositors. The Reserve Bank of India is monitoring the developments and has arranged to provide adequate cash to ICICI Bank to meet the demands of its customers at its branches/ ATMs.
The ICICI Bank and its subsidiary banks abroad are well capitalised.
Alpana Killawala
Chief General Manager
Press Release : 2008-2009/412
Sincerely,
Nazia Sayeed
Office of Head Service Quality
ICICI Bank Ltd.
It was nice of the folks at ICICI to respond to my humble blog, albeit with a standardized message. I’d like to clarify that I don’t think that ICICI is going to collapse, but at the same time I do feel that it is relatively more at risk in terms of Subprime exposure than other Indian banks. I certainly do not think that given the level of depostitory requirements that Indian banks must comply with - that there’s any reason reason to start pulling out your money from ATMs. Just as the US government protect retail deposits, so would the Indian government.
At the same time, there is the possibility that ICICI will face larger than expected losses from its exposures. Make no mistake - ICICI has already earmaked $260mn+ (Rs. 1000 Cr.+) for losses due to exposure to Credit Derivatives. This was way back in January, and then was talked about again in March. A *lot* of time has passed since March, and alot of negative developments have also taken place.
My worry is that in light of the recent events (Lehman, HBOS, AIG collapse etc.) that there may be further losses. That’s the scary thing about the Subprime mess. When on entity falls over - other firms it owes fall over. Those other firms also owe somebody, who owe somebody else and so on. Suddenly, before you know it, you thought that a counterparty that was good for its promise to pay you what they owe you, no longer is in a position to do so.
According to this article in the Business Standard, its UK arm has 89% of its non indian investments book - estimated at $3.5bn - has an S&P rating of A- or above. ‘Only’ 18%, or $700mn has exposure to the US. I think that an ‘A-’ isn’t a fabulous rating, mind you. The highest rating given by S&P is AAA, after which we have AA, A, BBB, BB etc. to until D. Note that BB and below is rated as ‘Non investment grade’ or ‘junk’. And remember, these are the same ratings agencies that gave AAA ratings to those Subprime backed assets that are actually at the root of this entire mess.
The article goes on to say that ICICI bank asserts that the UK subsidiary has ‘no exposure’ to US subprime. Surely they do have some exposure, albeit indirectly, otherwise they wouldn’t have had that $264mn mark to market loss in the first place?
In fact, according to this article in the Financial Express, ICICI bank has a total of $2.2bn worth of expsosure to credit derivatives. What the underlying for these credit derivatives are, we don’t know. To an extent that is not even that important. I wonder, has ICICI booked all of those losses? Did it close out those derivative positions? Hopeful they did.
Thus, while a ‘collapse’ of ICICI bank, in my opinion, is highly unlikely, we may learn of larger than expected MTM losses on the back of credit derivatives. If this does happen, while the depositor doesn’t have anything to be worried about, it wouldn’t exactly be good news for the ICICI bank shareholder.
Disclaimer: This is not investment advice nor should be construed as such. Do *not* make any investment decisions based on what you read in this article, or anything else on this blog. All views presented here are solely the opinion of the author’s.
Somebody called me early this morning telling me that they had heard fresh rumours that ICICI bank was going to collapse in the wake of the credit crisis. Clearly, a number of people in Hyderabada also heard this rumour, and panicked. According to this TOI story, people were lining up at ATMs to pull their money out.
On September 17, ICICI bank’s management strongly denied rumours that the management was offloading ICICI shares. Share prices dropped from Rs. 720 on September 8 to Rs. 560 on September 17. They rose again to Rs. 634 on September 22, and are currently trading at Rs. 493, marginally down from yesterday’s close.
In my opinion, while ICICI may have not insignificant Mark to Market (MTM) losses from its exposure to credit derivatives, there is *no way* that ICICI bank would collapse. It’s India’s AIG, for all practical purposes. As the second largest bank in India, the regulator would never let such a thing happen. Moreover, even if it did face large MTM losses, given the fact that it recently raised $5bn in equity capital - I imagine that this is more than enough to tide it over in uncertain times.
If you don’t believe these rumours, then ICICI is looking pretty attractive, trading at a PE of 15, and almost a third of its yearly high in January of Rs. 1440.
Disclaimer: This post or any other content advice is not investment advice and should not be construed as such. All views presented here are solely the opinion of the author’s.
Disclosure: I don’t hold any shares of ICICI Bank.
I had a nice little pause in blogging last week, primarily because I was living (I write as if it has past) one of the biggest financial disasters of all time, first hand. It started late friday night as I was leaving from work, I read the Fed was holding a meeting with Lehman. Now mind you, many people knew Lehman was in trouble due to the lack of confidence and the rumors out on the street. So although important, I took off, it had no bearing on our investments.
Then Saturday afternoon I read a short story about the world’s banking heads convening at the Fed’s office downtown. This included the CEOs of Goldman, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Lehman, Citigroup, Merrill, Bank of America, Barclays, etc. Simaltaneously, the rumor on Barclays buying Lehman started growing stronger and news on WaMu, AIG and Wachovia grew louder.
By Sunday it was intense. I walked into work and I was glued to the monitor as the movie-like drama unfolded. The posts below go through the history more or less.
Even those who were smart enough to recognize that the independent investment bank model was no longer viable thought that Goldman would get acquired.
There were whispers that the ~ GBP 103 Billion HSBC (the only mega cap bank stock to actually give investors a positive return year to date), would be the one to pick up the franchise. I for one, was one of the people who liked this story – it made sense right? There really didn’t seem to be anybody else who had the firepower at least liquidity-wise to pull off that kind of trade.
I was naive. I forgot about Goldman.
Firepower clearly has nothing to do with liquidity. The kind of lobby that Goldman commands is undeniable. How else do you explain the fact that Bear, Merrill, and Lehman were allowed to fail (more…)
Analysts blame the high interest rate environment on the poor results. Some 70% of car sales are financed, and high interest rates make it more expensive to take out loans to pay for their car purchases. The small car segment is thought to be more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, as the middle class families that buy from this segment cannot afford to make outright purchases.
I largely agree with the rationale presented above. However, the high interest rate environment should have had an equally damaging effect on Hyundai’s sales as well. Even if you take into account that Hyundai’s August 2007 base of 16,000 cars was lower than Maruti’s base of 60,000 cars – you cannot explain away such a dramatic a dramatic difference in results.
The reason for Maruti’s poor performance goes beyond the interest rate environment. Since the Swift Maruti hasn’t had any new launches of note. Moreover, its marketing has been limited and unfocussed. Its strategy of driving sales through schemes in the rural and semi-urban segment – although intuitively appealing (tap into less served segments) – failed to provide results. The likely reason is that households in these regions, who have fewer financing options, are even more interest rate (more…)
The 12-13% Wholesale price index (WPI) inflation in India is usually blamed on two things: higher energy prices and higher crude. If you look at food prices, they’ve only increased by 6.2% this year. Crude has gone up by 16.5% but these prices have not been passed on to consumers as it is being subsidized by government. So where are these 12% plus inflation figures originating from?
The culprit is manufactured goods. Inflation here is running at 10.8% - this despite the fact that industrial growth has slowed. In April, the year on year (yoy) inflation was 6.2%, and in May this fell to 3.8%. This begs the question – why are prices increasing so much if growth is so muted? And if you cannot blame oil or food for rising input costs what can you blame? (more…)
There has been a lot of chatter in the market about FIIs staying away from the Indian markets because they feel that the valuations in India are still relatively quite expensive. Index PE ratios, when looked at in comparison to historical levels are a good way to determine how cheaply/fairly/expensively the companies that make up the index are relative to their historical levels.
But first, an explanation of how an ‘Index’ is calculated: There several ways to create an ‘index’ but the method commonly used is the ‘free float market capitalisation methodology’ where very crudely Indices are calculated adding together the market capitalisation of each of the companies chosen for that index based on some sort of criteria, dividing that figure by the sum of the market capitalisation of those companies that met the same criteria in a base year and then (more…)
After the January 21 crash, I was pretty sure that the investor participation in both cash and derivatives had suffered, but when I had look at the NSE turnover figures, I was pleasantly surprised. For the first four months of the fiscal, turnover in the cash segment has averaged at around 13,200 Cr., only 7% from the previous fiscal. Admittedly, the numbers for Feb and March must have pulled down the 2008 average - the average daily cash segment turnover for October 2007 peaked at almost 21,000 Cr. for the NSE. In January, the figure was (more…)
ContentSutra reported that Seventy mm, the online dvd rental company has raised $12mn in its third round of funding:
Bangalore-based online DVD rental company Seventy mm has received $12.5 million (Rs 50 crore) from NEA Indo US Ventures. This will be the third round of funding for Seventymm, which now has a total capital of around $22 million.
Seventy mm plans to use this money to expand its online offering, and not foray into retail as Reliance Entertainment’s Big Flix are doing.
I was thinking of switching to Seventy mm away from my account at the local Shemaroo video store - they charge a ridiculous Rs. 125 per DVD per day (although for ‘old’ customers they’re pretty relaxed on the late fee policy). The reason why I haven’t made the switch (more…)
Meet Rajesh (embarrassingly despite numerous conversations with him, I actually don’t remember his name, so I’ve made one up) – the paanwaala that sits next to a chai shop outside my office:
He’s a pretty enterprising guy – he used to own a textile factory specializing in shirt fabric, in Lukhnow, Uttar Pradesh. Unfortunately, a few of his big buyers that were based in MG road in Delhi (the road that connects Delhi to Gurgaon) were forcibly shut down after the Supreme Court gave the order to demolish illegal developments / encroachments.
I remember just a couple of months ago – he used to sit on a footpath to sell his wares (he didn’t have the fancy table-cabinet that you see now). Now he’s not only got a paan shop in Tardeo, but one in Bandra as well. Hats off to him for getting back on his feet!
The reason why I’m writing about him though is not because of his entrepreneurship qualities. It’s because I overheard a fairly amusing conversation (more…)
Manmohan Singh prepared a Working Paper for the International Monetary Fund in December 2007, in light of the curbs imposed by the Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI). It clearly explains the history and origins of P-notes and suggested at the time what the impact of the curb may be.
Some history:
Since 1992, when FIIs were allowed to invest in Indian equity markets after the balance of payments crisis, an offshore market for PNs developed as a primary conduit for foreign investors to invest in India.
The origins of such flows stems from the bilateral tax treaty that India has had with Mauritius. The main provision of the 1983 treaty was that no resident of Mauritius would be taxed in India on capital gains arising from the sale of securities in India. The treaty therefore gave capital gains exemption for investments routed via Mauritius. Despite the uniform reduction in capital gains tax arbitrage that existed from the early 1990s through July 2004, it is interesting to note that there has been a rapid growth in the market for PNs in the last three to four years.
In the decade, short term capital gains have been as high as 40% and long term capital gains as high as 20%. However, since July 2004, the tax treatment on short term (security held for less than 1 year) capital gainshave been reduced to 10%, and there are no taxes (more…)
We haven’t heard much (except Bhave telling some investors that SEBI may allow it, read BS article here) about Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) since SEBI released the draft guidelines in December last year - but I think that its a very interesting concept and worth a revisit.
Real estate in India has experienced exceptional growth since 2004-05, with some cities even experiencing a more than 50% price rise on a compounded annual basis. While pundits and the common man alike are slightly nervous owing to double digit inflation, rising crude prices, and a stumbling equity market - leading to a cooling of real estate prices in tier 1 cities, residential and commercial real projects in tier 2 and tier 3 cities are holding firm. 8 months have already passed since the equity market crash of January this year, and while many are forecasting a further drop in the markets, others are talking more optimistically about us already having bottomed out, and the interest rate cycle having peaked. This bodes well for the real estate market, and as inflation and interest rates start coming off over the next 6 months (we hope) - this will lead to a resumption of the real estate bull run.
With this backdrop, Indian investors are slated to have access to real estate investment trusts (REITS) as the country is poised to embrace deregulation and further formalization of its booming real estate market.
The move is driven in part by the demand fuelled by domestic players looking to implement ambitious expansion plans. Reits have been introduced in most of Asia’s leading markets (Singapore, HK and Japan) in the last seven years and the introduction of Indian Reits will prevent the profitable Reit business going overseas. Moreover, as property prices in the the US and elsewhere crumble in light of the subprime mess, foreign investors seeking to allocate their capital to real estate will seek to put their funds elsewhere - e.g. developing economies such as India, where although there has been recent turmoil, fundamentals are strong, and this may be a good opportunity to get in at a bargain. Reits would certainly be a mechanism that simplifies investment (more…)
Until a few weeks ago a target price of $100 for crude would have been laughable. The market seemed sure prices would steadily climb towards $200.
So what has happened since then, other than the 25% fall in price?
For a start, many people now predict a fall in global demand, as economies adjust consumption in light of growth forecasts and the high price. This reduction in planned consumption has released the pressure which kept oil at $140 per barrel.
However, it was well known several months ago that further rises in the price of oil would damage the economy; in other words that $200 was not sustainable.
Why then were we so happy to believe prices would continue to rise, and why are we not now revising growth forecasts back up, in light of the recent fall in oil price?
That growth forecasts are not being seriously revised is due to tight global credit markets and perceived instability in the financial system restricting investment, while commodity price inflation is still hurting consumers’ real spending power.
The question of why we were willing to believe oil would continue to rise is more challenging: I believe the markets underestimated the speed with which the US credit problems would spread to the real economy outside the US. This led to an early reduction (more…)
In many ways the US has recently been facing the kind of balance of payments problems which have been seen many times before, but most often in emerging economies.
For several years now, the US has run a large trade deficit by feeding domestic consumption with cheap imports from emerging economies, most notably China. The large flow of money out of the economy was offset by inward capital investment from Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
Since the credit crunch started to bite, the stability of the US financial system has been called into question by the failure of Bear Stearns and the public difficulties faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Coupled with the Fed policy of cutting interest rates to fend off a recession and the gloomy consumer outlook underpinned by housing market instability, the US has become a much less attractive destination for international capital.
Along with low liquidity in global markets, the deteriorating attractiveness of the US has put pressure on the dollar to weaken to keep the money flowing in. These were the main factors behind the dollar hitting lows against the EUR, GBP and JPY in Q1 2008.
However the dollar has strengthened in Q2 and the beginning of Q3, largely due to the weakness of other developed economies; the Eurozone and the UK flirt dangerously with their own recessions and the outlook for the Japanese economy looks little better. Whether the dollar rally will continue depends largely on three factors; firstly, whether the Fed can maintain stability (more…)
Given the recent news SEBI considering (but not doing anything yet) about revoking the P-note ban, I thought it might be a good idea to revisit the topic. Thank you to Akshay for passing on info that has helped me better write this post.
In India, only domestic investors, or ‘Foreign Institutional Investors’ (FIIs) - those foreign institutions that have registered with SEBI, are allow to invest into the equity markets directly. Participatory notes (P-notes) allow foreign investors, such as hedge funds, which are not registered with SEBI to invest easily in the Indian equity market.
Practically, the way that P-notes work is that a foreign investor - say a hedge fund - would deposit funds with an FII that is authorized to issue P-notes, who would use the funds to purchase shares as instructed by the hedge fund. The FII would then issue a P-note to the hedge fund, which is essentially a certificate that says that it is entitled to X shares of company ABC, and any capital gains or losses and dividend payments would be passed onto the hedge fund. In return for this service, the hedge fund would pay the FII a fee.
A crude example: If a hedge fund not registered with SEBI wants to buy one share of Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL), their FII would pick up a share of HUL for Rs. 240 and write a contract that says that in return for a fee and the Rs. 240 paid by the hedge fund, when the hedge fund asks the broker to sell the share they will comply and pay back the hedge the Rs. 240 plus or minus the rise or fall of the share price and the dividends if there were any.
Because foreign investors bought P-notes from reputable FIIs (they knew that they wouldn’t go back on the agreement), and there was a healthy supply of P-notes going around, foreign institutions were able to trade these P-notes amongst themselves.
On October 16, 2007, N. Damodaran, the then SEBI chief issued a decision to curb foreign participation through P-notes as he felt that there was excess money being pumped into the Indian market unchecked leading to volatility - which is always bad thing, especially for the retail investor (more…)
It was widely believed that CS Bhave was strongly in favour of overturning earlier SEBI chief’s N. Damodaran’s decision to curb Foreign participation through P-notes (more…)
With the emergence of large domestic (Pantaloon’s Big Bazaar) and international players (Metro AG, Tesco, Tesco/Trent- read my post on this, Bharti/Wal-Mart) in large scale organized retail, I got to thinking – how does this affect the margins of consumer product companies such has Hindustan Unilever, Colgate-Palmolive, and Cavin Kare? On one hand, you might see margins (the different between how much you sell for and how much it costs you) on goods increasing due to a lower distribution cost – its easier to distribute 100,000 bars of Lux soap to one Metro AG in one go, than distribute that amount in rural India.
On the other hand, since these stores buy in bulk, they’re in a much better position to negotiate on cost – therefore pushing margins down. Moreover, many of these stores (more…)
It seems that two years after Tesco started negotiating (and failed to reach an agreement) with the Bharti group, the retail giant is entering the country in a joint venture with the Tata’s retail arm, Trent. Now this is not a traditional joint venture – these two companies are not sharing the capital investment and the profits. Tesco is giving Trent’s hypermarkets (very large supermarkets) exclusive access to its IT systems, supply chain (which includes access to Tesco’s low cost vendors – many of which are based in India), and infrastructure management (tools that Tesco has developed to better manage the retail spaces, inventory, delivery etc.). In return for this exclusive arrangement Tata is (more…)
The articles in this blog are personal opinions of the authors' and should not be construed as investment advice.
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@hawkeye the answer is to put together a citizens interest/lobbying group but w/ funds, large number of people and an abilty to influence. in reply to hawkeye2008-11-28
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#mumbai I'm involved in chain emails of anger. Divisiveness, however is not the answer. Reactionary responses are irresponsible. 2008-11-28
