The (MACD) Indicator is a technical analysis method first developed in the 1960s by Gerald Appel, a prominent author in investment and trading strategy. MACD stands for Moving Average Convergence-Divergence and is based on the comparison of fast and slow exponential moving average prices. Proponents of MACD Indicator methodology argue it can be used to identify trend changes in stocks and indices.
Picking stocks in a Bear market can be both rewarding (as in the long term you see spectular returns) but also tricky (if you don’t invest near the bottom, then you’re in trouble if the market falls aggressively. Here are some general rules of thumb when it comes to picking stocks in a bear market:
Large Blue chips: Go for large, well established blue chips rather than mid-caps or small caps. While these are the first to be beaten in a bear market, they are also the very first to recover. Smaller shares are more likely to be dependent on one industry, and will have less access / negotiating power with banks for access credit - something that is absolutely critical in today’s environment of a severe credit squeeze.
Neccessity rather than luxury: Focus on buying stocks of companies that sell a product or service that is a neccessity rather than a luxury. The reason is simple: when people’s confidence in the economy, the stability of their job / business and therefore their future income is threatened (as it is in a bear market) they’re going to cut back on all their luxuries including designer clothes, watches, luxury cars etc. They cannot cut back (much) on medicines, food, water, electricity, petrol. Business will also cut back on what they may believe are luxuries - advertising, and expensive offices and furniture. Not only will companies cut back spending on real estate, but individuals and households will also avoid ‘large spends’ on new houses, cars etc.Sectors which have shown to have done well in past bear markets include major pharmaceutical, food producers, tobacco, telephone (now more likely cellular phone), basic household products, oil and energy and utilities companies. This is pretty much in line with what we’ve seen thus far - companies like Hindustan Lever, which is actually up since January, or GSK pharma, which has only lost about Rs. 20 since its January highs.Sectors which have shown to do poorly in bear markets are house / real estate builders, motor vehicle related businesses, industrial materials or machinery / capital goods, advertising or advertising dependent companies, and financials. With real estate, most motor vehicle, and every financial stock suffering (financials are down between 70-90% from their January highs) this general rule of thumb seems to be highly applicable.
Domestic focus: Choose stocks that have a focus on the domestic economy and are not reliance on exports / foreign operations, especially outside of emerging markets and in the US / UK / Europe.
Low ‘beta’ - less than 1: Beta is a measure of how much the stock tends to move with a market move, or crudely, its relative volatility. For example, a stock has a beta of 2 then a 10% fall in the Sensex would typically lead to a 20% fall in the stock. Picking stocks with a low beta means that when the market recovers, your stocks may not ’soar’ but this certainly protects you if the market continues to fall. If you pick a stock with a beta, of say 0.5, then a 10% market fall is likely to only lead to a 5% price fall for that stock.
High dividend yield shares: Dividend yield is how much the annual dividend the company pays out divided by the current market price. So if the stock price is Rs. 100, and the last dividend that the company paid was Rs. 20, the Dividend yield is 20%. Buying stocks that have a high dividend yield is a useful way of protecting yourself against further falls in stock prices. If for example, the stock price falls by 10% and the dividend yield is 20% (provided you hold the stock long enough / at the right time to be eligible for that dividend) then the overall return is +10%.Of course, make sure that the dividend yield is over the prevailing (risk free) fixed bank deposit rate - you need to be compensated for the fact that while the fixed deposit rate will give you guaranteed returns, a company could cut its dividend as and when it feels like it. Be careful however - high dividend yielding stocks can also spell trouble: very high dividends means that the company may be spending too high a proportion of its profits on dividends. If profits fall, the dividend will get suddenly cut, and the stock price will plummet because nobody likes a stock that cuts its dividends. In order to guard against such instances, trying buying a stock with a dividend cover of 1.8 or more. ‘Dividend Cover’ is Earnings per share divided by dividends per share. If the company’s profits are stable, and it has a dividend cover of 1.8 or more, you can be assured that the company is unlikely to cut dividends suddenly.When looking for dividend yielding stocks, also try to focus on well established, well known blue chip companies, because they’ll avoid cutting dividends in order to protect their name and reputation.
Stocks to avoid: Stocks with high PE ratios and low dividend yields are likely to see a price correction, and dividend payments aren’t going to be sufficient to protect you. Stocks with few or no tangible assets are also vulnerable. The lower the tangible assets, the lower the company’s ability to get access to cheap credit, especially in an environment such as this, where liquidity has dried up. At the same time, avoid companies that have a lot of debt (a debt to equity ratio of higher than 25%) - in a high interest rate environment such as this (even to interest rates are being cut), those companies saddled with a lot of debt are likely to default, and unlikely to be able to raise further credit.
Timing - carefully examine support / resistance levels: While a stock might be fundamentally a good buy, it makes sense to try and purchase it near its support (the price level that the stock falls but bounces back from) rather than resistance (the price level that the stock keeps rising to but falls back from). Determining support / resistance levels is not very difficult if you look at a company’s stock chart.
Its not really news when I say that we’re in a bear market (the widely accepted definition for western equity markets is a sustained 20% drop is much smaller than the 50% drop of the Nifty from our January high of 6357). But the question on everybody’s mind is - where are we in this bear market? The beginning, the middle, or at the end (the bottom)? Let’s have a look at the past three Indian bear markets and see if we can get some clues (data below sourced from Morgan Stanley Report, “India Strategy: How to Cope with a Bear Market”, published on 13 March 2008):
First: 2 April 1992 (top) - 26 April 1993 (bottom)
12 months trailing PE at the Bull market peak: 33.9
At the Bear market bottom: 13.6
Decline of 60%
Time taken in days to cross the previous high: 1425 (4 years)
6 months return from the bottom: 34%
From the above data we can see that:
A bear market leads to an average decline of 51% of the index, and upto 60% decline in PE ratios
If you managed to invest at the bottom, 6 months down the line you’d have made an average of 35% return (although spotting the bottom is near impossible - so this is rather misleading)
It lasts anywhere between 1-2 years
It takes anywhere between 2.5 to 5 years for the market to ‘recover fully’ to its previous peak - therefore the bear market is accompanied by a considerable ‘horizontal’ market
The bull market peak is over 32x earnings (PE ratio), and tends to more than halve at the bottom.
Now lets compare the above learnings from above to the ‘Bear Market’ of 2008:
Tipping point: Subprime leading to FII exit
If October 27 low, was the bottom then it has only lasted about 9 months
Sensex peak at 21,207
Sensex October 27 low at 7697
Decline of 64%
Nifty peak at 6357
Nifty October 27 low at 2253
Decline of 65%
12 months trailing Nifty PE at the Bull market peak: 28.3
At October 27 low: 10.7
Decline of 62%
Clearly we have overshot the average index decline of 51% that we have seen in previous bear markets, by a significant 13 percentage points. We have also seen large declines in index PE ratios - 4 percentage points more than the last bear market. Moreover, the PE on October 27 was an astoundingly low 10.7 - the lowest ever for the data since January 99, as I talk about in my post here.
This begs the questions - how much longer do we have to suffer such a market?
History tells us that there seems to be 3 ‘phases’ of a bear market:
First phase: A sharp initial fall - ‘capitulation’
Middle phase: A bear market rally on low volumes, where some investors a lulled into the false sense that the bear market is over
Final phase: Long slow downward grind in price where market valuations hit rock bottom
Clues that the bear market is coming to an end:
Indiscriminate selling leading to sharp falls
A major potential corporate or political crisis
Highly negative but irrational rumours about financially sound companies
Very low PE ratios for blue chip companies - often in single digits.
Based on history and what we’ve seen above, I’d wager that we’re at the beginning of the final phases of the bear market. We have seen a lot of volatility, and quite a significant rally over the last week, from 7967 to over 10,000 - a rally which seems to be coming to an end as I write this.
Globally, we have already seen unprecendented collapses in the banking and insurance sector - AIG, Lehman, Bear Stearns, HBOS etc. just to name a few. We haven’t seen an bankruptcies / defaults in India at such a significant scale, although rumours of ICICI bank collapsing, and then Unitech defaulting were rife. As far as PE ratios are concerned the Nifty’s trailing PE was at its lowest in a decade last week. All these point to us having crossed the bottom.
Do note however, that the 7697 low was not lower than the previous bull market’s peak, something that seems to be a pattern. Moroever, as I reported here, FIIs have only pulled out 20% of their investment in India, and I expect that this is not the end. Whether they like it or not, they may be forced to pull more out of our market even at these attractive valuations, in order to meet liabilities or liquidity pressures due to redemptions.
Well, the interest rate cycle has already turned, indeed quite aggressively with the Congress government trying do do everything it can before the elections in March next year, including leaning on banks to cut rates (which has worked). Inflation is on its way down, so that’s also pretty good news. Corporate earnings results have been really bad this quarter and we might see another couple of quarters of bad results before they start to improve. Therefore I think there is a lower bottom down the line. When will we see it? After another round of FII money getting pulled out, optimistically, I think we’ll probably see it over the next 6 months, pessimistically - given the grave global scenario - 12 months. That would make the bear market period 15-21 months.
As far as recovery is concerned, ’strong economic fundamentals’ can be cited in favour of the arguement for a shorter horizontal period. Fundamentals, however, doesn’t really seem to help when the global economy is in the toilet, and there’s no foreign money to push the market back up to the levels that it saw in this bull run.
The crash of the Indian Stock Market since January 2008 has been widely attributed to FIIs pulling their money out to meet liabilities and redemptions. According to this article, however, FIIs have only pulled out $12.7bn and still have another $53.7bn, or almost Rs. 270,000 Cr. left in the market.
A lot of market experts are talking about the market being near the bottom (”Valuations just cannot get any cheaper! The Indian growth story is sound, even at 7%!”) Let’s be clear on this: these falling prices are not about fundamentals - its simply about lack of liquidity. FIIs are not exiting the market because they want to, but because they are being forced to - nobody wants to book such massive losses, and nobody would argue against the fact that as an emerging market India is looking pretty cheap.
The fact that there’s so much FII money still in the market - 80% - is quite scary (more…)
One of the most elegant applications of mathematics to finance has been in the field of portfolio theory. Active portfolio management requires investors to not only select risky securities, but also decide the appropriate weightage to ascribe to each security in the portfolio.
Developed by Markowitz and Sharpe in the early 1960’s, modern portfolio theory defines portfolio risk and return in precise terms: portfolio return is the weighted average of the expected return of individual securities while portfolio risk, is the weighted sum of individual asset covariances. This simple insight allows us to determine the condition for the efficient frontier – a set of portfolios that combine various risky assets in proportions that yield maximum return for a given level of risk.
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The PortfolioEdge algorithm uses an innovative methodology to estimate the model weightage of stocks in your portfolio. The fundamental intuition behind the allocation mechanism is the Reward-to-Risk ratio (R2R), which is analogous to the Sharpe Ratio under modern portfolio theory. However, unlike the Sharpe Ratio, the measure of risk is not volatility (standard deviation), but expected capital loss.
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There’s been so much change in the global banking landscape, with banks going bankrupt, being nationalised, and being bought over by others that its become quite difficult to keep track.
Check out this excellent interactive by FT that takes you though a 10,000 feet chronological walk though a Global ‘Bank Street’, telling you which banks have been nationalized, bought over, expanding, or have a new business model. Sigh I still cannot get over the fact that we’ll soon be able to get a Goldman Sachs Debit Card.
There has been a lot of discussion / panic in the markets with regards to ICICI bank.
Nobody really knows what’s going on, but everybody is worried (see this article, which was a result of the response I got from ICICI bank for this article). What we do know is that there were intial reports in January, and then in March we were told that ICICI bank had declared over $260mn in credit derivative losses, on a total exposure of $2.2bn. In mid September there were rumours floating around about ICICI bank going under. These were put to rest by assurance by Kamath, SEBI and the RBI. Then there were more rumours a couple of days ago, and it almost seemed like there was a bit of a run on the bank, with people in Hyderabad, amongst other places, lining up at ATMs to pull out their cash.
While my view is that there isn’t smoke without a fire, and even Bear Stearns denied initially that there wasn’t anything wrong. While I think that ICICI bank shareholders might see a further deterioration in share price, I don’t think that people holding accounts at the retail bank really have much to worry about.
ICICI bank’s business, like any conglomorate bank, can be broadly categorized into - the wholesale/ investment banking arm, which would bear the exposure to the credit derivative instruments, and the retail banking side, which takes deposits from individuals and small businesses. I couldn’t manage to get a hold of the corporate structure or of ICICI Bank, but these businesses should be structurally separate even if they are owned by the same holding company, ICICI Bank.
If this is the case, it would mean that while the shareholders are exposed to both businesses, the customers of the retail bank are relatively safer from the effects of the losses of the wholesale banking / investment banking arm.
Also, as ICICI sets out above, it is mandatory for all Indian Scheduled Commercial Banks to retain 34% of the deposit base in the form of Government Securities (SLR) and cash with RBI (CRR).
Retail depositors are also protected to a limited extent (Rs. 100,000) by depositor insurance (check an article about depositor insurance here: www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=64).
I also believe that like the Fed could not let AIG, an institution that is far to large and far too embedded in the livelihoods of the American population, fail, similarly, the RBI would never let India’s largest private bank fail.
So if I was an ICICI bank retail depositor. I wouldn’t go running to ATMs to pull my cash out, just yet.
Disclaimer: This blog or any other content on this blog should not be construed as financial or investment advice. All views presented here are solely the opinion of the author’s.
Disclosure: I don’t hold any positions in ICICI Bank.
So this is what happened in the US. Banks started giving mortgages to people who had a poor credit record (sub-prime), and clearly couldn’t afford to pay back the loans. They knew this but thought that since house prices would always go up, borrowers could always refinance their loans against the additional equity due to appreciated house prices. Alternatively, banks thought that they could take over the defaulter’s home and sell it for higher than the original loan amount. Of course, what brought the house of cards down was the fact that of course house prices didn’t continue to go up: borrowers defaulted en masse so banks were stuck with a ton of houses (increase in supply of houses), and since they now stopped lending to people who couldn’t afford to pay, demand for houses fell. Falling house prices lead to more defaulting, which lead to a further fall in house prices and so on.
Why wouldn’ this happen in India? Two words: Black money. Property in India is purchased using both declared income, on which taxes have been paid (white money) and undeclared income, on which taxes haven’t been paid (black money). When a borrower takes out a mortgage in India, he’ll obviously only get the loan for the amount paid in ‘white’. However, if he defaults, the bank will take possession of the entire house, which is probably much higher in value because of the ‘black’ component. Only if there is an extremely aggressively fall in real estate prices - so much so that the black component is wiped out (which given our fairly strong domestic economy, is unlikely), do we have something to worry about.
So black money serves as a protective cushion - who would have though it?
Many are loudly criticizing Paulson’s mega bailout fund. $700bn is not a small amount considering the fact that the global GDP as of 2007 is estimated at around $55 trn (1% of global GDP), and the size of the US economy is around $14 trn (therefore around 5% of US GDP).
People are saying that the US taxpayer is getting squeezed from every which angle to make up for the irresponsibility of mega ‘sophisticated’ financial institutions. Not only is he having to deal with a fall in the prices of his real estate assets, costlier credit, job insecurity and business uncertainty, he’s now having to subsidize something that he doesn’t even understand. This is not entirely true however (more…)
If you’ve been watching the market, even if not very closely, you’ll agree with me that it’s been – at the risk of sounding facetious – surreal.
Monday felt like a train wreck – Paulson’s refusal to bailout Lehman over the weekend and its subsequent bankruptcy announcement, and Merrill’s overnight sale to Bank of America (BoA) had my head spinning. If the Monday wasn’t black enough with news of Lehman and Merrill, we quickly learned that AIG was going around with a begging bowl trying to raise capital in the tens of billions to escape bankruptcy. Monday closed with the Dow 500 points down – that’s almost 5% - in contrast to the less that 1% movements that we’re used to seeing for that index.
In a discussion with a friend we realised that two global and highly esteemed (although Lehman had a more patchy 160 year history than Merrill Lynch) had within days just *poof!* ceased to exist. While BoA will probably retain the Merrill brand, its unlikely that my kids will ever hear the word ‘Lehman’. Indeed Lehman Brothers will probably be relegated to a notch in Barclay’s timeline on their website’s ‘About Us’ page.
In this meltdown of stock market, realty sector is bleeding the most. It is down 65% from its peak. The sector is under performing due to hardening interest rates and rising commodity prices. Many of the realty are now available at attractive valuations as a result of re-rating in this sector.
One of the growth pick in this segment is HCC. HCC is an integrated group with eight decades of experience and has interests in construction, real estate, and infrastructure development. HCC specializes in technical complex, new age construction in infrastructure projects, as well as EPC, BOT, integrated projects and townships. (more…)
One of our reader’s comment on Gautam’s post brought up an interesting point, regarding oil and it’s affect on the dollar (and by association the rupee). The question arises: Why has the Rupee done an about-turn against the dollar? The Dollar Smile Hypothesis developed by Stephen Jen at Morgan Stanley helps explain the correlation.
In very general terms, currency valuations are based on the growth rate of the particular nation. Since the US economy has been growing at a slower clip, the dollar should weaken against the global basket of currencies. We have seen exactly that, especially last year where we reached 39 Rupees a dollar from 46. However, a curious thing has occurred in just the last couple months: the dollar has in fact strengthened against the world’s currencies including the Rupee as we can see:
The theory suggests that the dollar has a convex relationship to US economic growth. Thus while it remains (more…)
Analysts blame the high interest rate environment on the poor results. Some 70% of car sales are financed, and high interest rates make it more expensive to take out loans to pay for their car purchases. The small car segment is thought to be more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, as the middle class families that buy from this segment cannot afford to make outright purchases.
I largely agree with the rationale presented above. However, the high interest rate environment should have had an equally damaging effect on Hyundai’s sales as well. Even if you take into account that Hyundai’s August 2007 base of 16,000 cars was lower than Maruti’s base of 60,000 cars – you cannot explain away such a dramatic a dramatic difference in results.
The reason for Maruti’s poor performance goes beyond the interest rate environment. Since the Swift Maruti hasn’t had any new launches of note. Moreover, its marketing has been limited and unfocussed. Its strategy of driving sales through schemes in the rural and semi-urban segment – although intuitively appealing (tap into less served segments) – failed to provide results. The likely reason is that households in these regions, who have fewer financing options, are even more interest rate (more…)
The 12-13% Wholesale price index (WPI) inflation in India is usually blamed on two things: higher energy prices and higher crude. If you look at food prices, they’ve only increased by 6.2% this year. Crude has gone up by 16.5% but these prices have not been passed on to consumers as it is being subsidized by government. So where are these 12% plus inflation figures originating from?
The culprit is manufactured goods. Inflation here is running at 10.8% - this despite the fact that industrial growth has slowed. In April, the year on year (yoy) inflation was 6.2%, and in May this fell to 3.8%. This begs the question – why are prices increasing so much if growth is so muted? And if you cannot blame oil or food for rising input costs what can you blame? (more…)
There has been a lot of chatter in the market about FIIs staying away from the Indian markets because they feel that the valuations in India are still relatively quite expensive. Index PE ratios, when looked at in comparison to historical levels are a good way to determine how cheaply/fairly/expensively the companies that make up the index are relative to their historical levels.
But first, an explanation of how an ‘Index’ is calculated: There several ways to create an ‘index’ but the method commonly used is the ‘free float market capitalisation methodology’ where very crudely Indices are calculated adding together the market capitalisation of each of the companies chosen for that index based on some sort of criteria, dividing that figure by the sum of the market capitalisation of those companies that met the same criteria in a base year and then (more…)
After the January 21 crash, I was pretty sure that the investor participation in both cash and derivatives had suffered, but when I had look at the NSE turnover figures, I was pleasantly surprised. For the first four months of the fiscal, turnover in the cash segment has averaged at around 13,200 Cr., only 7% from the previous fiscal. Admittedly, the numbers for Feb and March must have pulled down the 2008 average - the average daily cash segment turnover for October 2007 peaked at almost 21,000 Cr. for the NSE. In January, the figure was (more…)
In many ways the US has recently been facing the kind of balance of payments problems which have been seen many times before, but most often in emerging economies.
For several years now, the US has run a large trade deficit by feeding domestic consumption with cheap imports from emerging economies, most notably China. The large flow of money out of the economy was offset by inward capital investment from Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
Since the credit crunch started to bite, the stability of the US financial system has been called into question by the failure of Bear Stearns and the public difficulties faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Coupled with the Fed policy of cutting interest rates to fend off a recession and the gloomy consumer outlook underpinned by housing market instability, the US has become a much less attractive destination for international capital.
Along with low liquidity in global markets, the deteriorating attractiveness of the US has put pressure on the dollar to weaken to keep the money flowing in. These were the main factors behind the dollar hitting lows against the EUR, GBP and JPY in Q1 2008.
However the dollar has strengthened in Q2 and the beginning of Q3, largely due to the weakness of other developed economies; the Eurozone and the UK flirt dangerously with their own recessions and the outlook for the Japanese economy looks little better. Whether the dollar rally will continue depends largely on three factors; firstly, whether the Fed can maintain stability (more…)
With the emergence of large domestic (Pantaloon’s Big Bazaar) and international players (Metro AG, Tesco, Tesco/Trent- read my post on this, Bharti/Wal-Mart) in large scale organized retail, I got to thinking – how does this affect the margins of consumer product companies such has Hindustan Unilever, Colgate-Palmolive, and Cavin Kare? On one hand, you might see margins (the different between how much you sell for and how much it costs you) on goods increasing due to a lower distribution cost – its easier to distribute 100,000 bars of Lux soap to one Metro AG in one go, than distribute that amount in rural India.
On the other hand, since these stores buy in bulk, they’re in a much better position to negotiate on cost – therefore pushing margins down. Moreover, many of these stores (more…)
The articles in this blog are personal opinions of the authors' and should not be construed as investment advice.
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@hawkeye the answer is to put together a citizens interest/lobbying group but w/ funds, large number of people and an abilty to influence. in reply to hawkeye2008-11-28
#mumbai Evidence of 40 terrorists having landed in Mumbai (NDTV). So where are the remaining 30? 2008-11-28
#mumbai I'm involved in chain emails of anger. Divisiveness, however is not the answer. Reactionary responses are irresponsible. 2008-11-28