The figures show that China’s GDP growth fell to 6.8% in the fourth quarter, down from 9% in the third quarter and is half of 13% growth rate in 2007. This implies that growth was virtually zero on a seasonally adjusted basis in the fourth quarter.
Industrial production has slowed even more sharply, growing by only 5.7% in the 12 months to December, compared with an 18% growth rate in last quarter of 2007. Chinese exports are likely to drop further in coming months as world demand shrinks. 2009 is expected to see first y-o-y decline in exports in past 25 years.
While forecasting GDP growth for any country economists take help from various criteria. One of the criteria is electricity output which is leads GDP growth as more electricity consumption eventually leads to higher GDP and decline in electricity output may mean that GDP is falling, In the graph, percentage growth in GDP and electricity output is shown. It can be easily seen that electricity output leads the GDP but magnifies rise of fall in GDP growth. By taking help of regression, economists have estimated that a negative 6 % growth in electricity output could convert to GDP growth in the range of 0-1 %.
Though this is not the only criteria, other criteria sush as export growth and its weight in the GDP, Housing growth indicator (which suffered a collapse due to slump in housing construction, caused by the government’s efforts to deflate a potential bubble) point even worse situation for China.
Measures taken by China
On January 21st it announced extra spending of 850 billion Yuan over three years to improve health care and Infrastructure.
From February, rural residents will get a 13% rebate on purchases of goods such as refrigerators, TVs and washing machines.
Interest rates have also been cut five times between September and January
Controls on bank lending have been scrapped. To help the property sector, minimum down-payments have been reduced from 30-40% of a home’s value to 20%, the transaction tax has been waived for properties held for at least two years, and more public housing is to be built.
Its not really news when I say that we’re in a bear market (the widely accepted definition for western equity markets is a sustained 20% drop is much smaller than the 50% drop of the Nifty from our January high of 6357). But the question on everybody’s mind is - where are we in this bear market? The beginning, the middle, or at the end (the bottom)? Let’s have a look at the past three Indian bear markets and see if we can get some clues (data below sourced from Morgan Stanley Report, “India Strategy: How to Cope with a Bear Market”, published on 13 March 2008):
First: 2 April 1992 (top) - 26 April 1993 (bottom)
12 months trailing PE at the Bull market peak: 33.9
At the Bear market bottom: 13.6
Decline of 60%
Time taken in days to cross the previous high: 1425 (4 years)
6 months return from the bottom: 34%
From the above data we can see that:
A bear market leads to an average decline of 51% of the index, and upto 60% decline in PE ratios
If you managed to invest at the bottom, 6 months down the line you’d have made an average of 35% return (although spotting the bottom is near impossible - so this is rather misleading)
It lasts anywhere between 1-2 years
It takes anywhere between 2.5 to 5 years for the market to ‘recover fully’ to its previous peak - therefore the bear market is accompanied by a considerable ‘horizontal’ market
The bull market peak is over 32x earnings (PE ratio), and tends to more than halve at the bottom.
Now lets compare the above learnings from above to the ‘Bear Market’ of 2008:
Tipping point: Subprime leading to FII exit
If October 27 low, was the bottom then it has only lasted about 9 months
Sensex peak at 21,207
Sensex October 27 low at 7697
Decline of 64%
Nifty peak at 6357
Nifty October 27 low at 2253
Decline of 65%
12 months trailing Nifty PE at the Bull market peak: 28.3
At October 27 low: 10.7
Decline of 62%
Clearly we have overshot the average index decline of 51% that we have seen in previous bear markets, by a significant 13 percentage points. We have also seen large declines in index PE ratios - 4 percentage points more than the last bear market. Moreover, the PE on October 27 was an astoundingly low 10.7 - the lowest ever for the data since January 99, as I talk about in my post here.
This begs the questions - how much longer do we have to suffer such a market?
History tells us that there seems to be 3 ‘phases’ of a bear market:
First phase: A sharp initial fall - ‘capitulation’
Middle phase: A bear market rally on low volumes, where some investors a lulled into the false sense that the bear market is over
Final phase: Long slow downward grind in price where market valuations hit rock bottom
Clues that the bear market is coming to an end:
Indiscriminate selling leading to sharp falls
A major potential corporate or political crisis
Highly negative but irrational rumours about financially sound companies
Very low PE ratios for blue chip companies - often in single digits.
Based on history and what we’ve seen above, I’d wager that we’re at the beginning of the final phases of the bear market. We have seen a lot of volatility, and quite a significant rally over the last week, from 7967 to over 10,000 - a rally which seems to be coming to an end as I write this.
Globally, we have already seen unprecendented collapses in the banking and insurance sector - AIG, Lehman, Bear Stearns, HBOS etc. just to name a few. We haven’t seen an bankruptcies / defaults in India at such a significant scale, although rumours of ICICI bank collapsing, and then Unitech defaulting were rife. As far as PE ratios are concerned the Nifty’s trailing PE was at its lowest in a decade last week. All these point to us having crossed the bottom.
Do note however, that the 7697 low was not lower than the previous bull market’s peak, something that seems to be a pattern. Moroever, as I reported here, FIIs have only pulled out 20% of their investment in India, and I expect that this is not the end. Whether they like it or not, they may be forced to pull more out of our market even at these attractive valuations, in order to meet liabilities or liquidity pressures due to redemptions.
Well, the interest rate cycle has already turned, indeed quite aggressively with the Congress government trying do do everything it can before the elections in March next year, including leaning on banks to cut rates (which has worked). Inflation is on its way down, so that’s also pretty good news. Corporate earnings results have been really bad this quarter and we might see another couple of quarters of bad results before they start to improve. Therefore I think there is a lower bottom down the line. When will we see it? After another round of FII money getting pulled out, optimistically, I think we’ll probably see it over the next 6 months, pessimistically - given the grave global scenario - 12 months. That would make the bear market period 15-21 months.
As far as recovery is concerned, ’strong economic fundamentals’ can be cited in favour of the arguement for a shorter horizontal period. Fundamentals, however, doesn’t really seem to help when the global economy is in the toilet, and there’s no foreign money to push the market back up to the levels that it saw in this bull run.
Many are loudly criticizing Paulson’s mega bailout fund. $700bn is not a small amount considering the fact that the global GDP as of 2007 is estimated at around $55 trn (1% of global GDP), and the size of the US economy is around $14 trn (therefore around 5% of US GDP).
People are saying that the US taxpayer is getting squeezed from every which angle to make up for the irresponsibility of mega ‘sophisticated’ financial institutions. Not only is he having to deal with a fall in the prices of his real estate assets, costlier credit, job insecurity and business uncertainty, he’s now having to subsidize something that he doesn’t even understand. This is not entirely true however Read the rest of this entry »
I attended my first Startup Saturday Mumbai event today at the SP Jain Management Institute. I must say that overall I was quite pleased by the entire event. By the end of the event (in our true Indian style, people including the speakers and myself arrived late), 35 odd people showed up. This was a good mix of entrepreneurs, would-be entrepreneurs, bloggers and (unfortunately only) one person from the VC community – Hemir Doshi from IDG VC India. Both speakers were good, but I enjoyed listening to Rang De’s founders’ story more than the talk on the ‘importance of monitoring competition’. Read the rest of this entry »
Analysts blame the high interest rate environment on the poor results. Some 70% of car sales are financed, and high interest rates make it more expensive to take out loans to pay for their car purchases. The small car segment is thought to be more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, as the middle class families that buy from this segment cannot afford to make outright purchases.
I largely agree with the rationale presented above. However, the high interest rate environment should have had an equally damaging effect on Hyundai’s sales as well. Even if you take into account that Hyundai’s August 2007 base of 16,000 cars was lower than Maruti’s base of 60,000 cars – you cannot explain away such a dramatic a dramatic difference in results.
The reason for Maruti’s poor performance goes beyond the interest rate environment. Since the Swift Maruti hasn’t had any new launches of note. Moreover, its marketing has been limited and unfocussed. Its strategy of driving sales through schemes in the rural and semi-urban segment – although intuitively appealing (tap into less served segments) – failed to provide results. The likely reason is that households in these regions, who have fewer financing options, are even more interest rate Read the rest of this entry »
We haven’t heard much (except Bhave telling some investors that SEBI may allow it, read BS article here) about Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) since SEBI released the draft guidelines in December last year - but I think that its a very interesting concept and worth a revisit.
Real estate in India has experienced exceptional growth since 2004-05, with some cities even experiencing a more than 50% price rise on a compounded annual basis. While pundits and the common man alike are slightly nervous owing to double digit inflation, rising crude prices, and a stumbling equity market - leading to a cooling of real estate prices in tier 1 cities, residential and commercial real projects in tier 2 and tier 3 cities are holding firm. 8 months have already passed since the equity market crash of January this year, and while many are forecasting a further drop in the markets, others are talking more optimistically about us already having bottomed out, and the interest rate cycle having peaked. This bodes well for the real estate market, and as inflation and interest rates start coming off over the next 6 months (we hope) - this will lead to a resumption of the real estate bull run.
With this backdrop, Indian investors are slated to have access to real estate investment trusts (REITS) as the country is poised to embrace deregulation and further formalization of its booming real estate market.
The move is driven in part by the demand fuelled by domestic players looking to implement ambitious expansion plans. Reits have been introduced in most of Asia’s leading markets (Singapore, HK and Japan) in the last seven years and the introduction of Indian Reits will prevent the profitable Reit business going overseas. Moreover, as property prices in the the US and elsewhere crumble in light of the subprime mess, foreign investors seeking to allocate their capital to real estate will seek to put their funds elsewhere - e.g. developing economies such as India, where although there has been recent turmoil, fundamentals are strong, and this may be a good opportunity to get in at a bargain. Reits would certainly be a mechanism that simplifies investment Read the rest of this entry »
Given the recent news SEBI considering (but not doing anything yet) about revoking the P-note ban, I thought it might be a good idea to revisit the topic. Thank you to Akshay for passing on info that has helped me better write this post.
In India, only domestic investors, or ‘Foreign Institutional Investors’ (FIIs) - those foreign institutions that have registered with SEBI, are allow to invest into the equity markets directly. Participatory notes (P-notes) allow foreign investors, such as hedge funds, which are not registered with SEBI to invest easily in the Indian equity market.
Practically, the way that P-notes work is that a foreign investor - say a hedge fund - would deposit funds with an FII that is authorized to issue P-notes, who would use the funds to purchase shares as instructed by the hedge fund. The FII would then issue a P-note to the hedge fund, which is essentially a certificate that says that it is entitled to X shares of company ABC, and any capital gains or losses and dividend payments would be passed onto the hedge fund. In return for this service, the hedge fund would pay the FII a fee.
A crude example: If a hedge fund not registered with SEBI wants to buy one share of Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL), their FII would pick up a share of HUL for Rs. 240 and write a contract that says that in return for a fee and the Rs. 240 paid by the hedge fund, when the hedge fund asks the broker to sell the share they will comply and pay back the hedge the Rs. 240 plus or minus the rise or fall of the share price and the dividends if there were any.
Because foreign investors bought P-notes from reputable FIIs (they knew that they wouldn’t go back on the agreement), and there was a healthy supply of P-notes going around, foreign institutions were able to trade these P-notes amongst themselves.
On October 16, 2007, N. Damodaran, the then SEBI chief issued a decision to curb foreign participation through P-notes as he felt that there was excess money being pumped into the Indian market unchecked leading to volatility - which is always bad thing, especially for the retail investor Read the rest of this entry »
When the equity markets are faring poorly due to a bad economic environment. When trying to figure out whether a company’s stock is defensive or not - ask yourself one question - are its products neccessities or luxuries? Can consumers cut back spending on them just because economic conditions are poor and they’ve possibly seen a reduction in wages, or been laid off? Indeed, could the consumption of the goods created by such a company rise in uncertain times?
Sectors that have traditionally been thought of as defensive include Food, Tobacco, Utilities, and Oil. Makes sense - the amount that households can cut back on Food is limited, and indeed, Tobacco consumption tends to go up when times are bad. When input costs rise, these are the companies that can pass on the price rises to the consumer. Therefore, in times of economic uncertainty, equity investors’ money flows into these types of stocks, leading to an increases in their prices.
However, when times are good, the stocks that fall into the above sectors aren’t star performers - for the opposite reason as outlined above, there’s only so much you can eat - indeed margins in the stocks of defensive industries are often quite low.
The figures show that China’s GDP growth fell to 6.8% in the fourth quarter, down from 9% in the third quarter and is half of 13% growth rate in 2007. This implies that growth was virtually zero on a seasonally adjusted basis in the fourth quarter.
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